Grim news from the United States's former battlefront. Al Qaeda in Iraq, now rebranded as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, has taken Fallujah, my colleague Liz Sly reported yesterday, and if this doesn't make you hang your head in despair over the decade-plus American "commitment" to the country, then nothing will. Except for maybe this explainer by Ned Parker, the former Baghdad bureau chief for The Los Angeles Times who shared a house with The Washington Post across the river from the Green Zone.
I spent much of the autumn of 2011 in Iraq on a reporting rotation as the world's attention turned to the Arab Spring and our foreign correspondents redeployed to hotter spots in Egypt and Libya. While in Iraq, I wanted to do a proper embed with the U.S. military, even though the bulk of soldiers' time was being spent closing up shop; combat operations had ceased over a year before and the military was in the midst of handing in-country responsibility to the U.S. State Department. Since the military offered me a road march with a battalion of the 82nd Airborne from Al-Asad Air Base in Anbar province to Camp Taji just outside Baghdad, I decided to write about Anbar, whose city of Fallujah was the site of the goriest moments of the war (the burning and lynching of foreign contractors, for example, and just about a third of U.S. combat deaths), as well as some of the most encouraging (the Sunni Awakening began there and helped pull the conflict out of an all-out death spiral). I thought a road march would allow me to see the province from the military's perspective -- from the confines of an MRAP vehicle -- and then I would double back and report from the sites they had passed on the journey. I shot this video, which depicts a battalion's efficient exit from Anbar, and wrote this story, which implied that the province was likely in the eye of a storm. The Americans were on their way out, and thus regarding the situation with a sense of neatness and finality, but the emotions and facts on the ground didn't align with their weary optimism.
The news out of Anbar, now over two years later, made me go back to my handwritten personal journal. Here's what I wrote, a bit after the fact:
Got to Al-Asad by Blackhawk. Helmet, flack jacket emblazoned with PRESS, Ray Bans, gun bay just to the side. On base, I had a minder but I forget his name. He gave me a tour of the base -- a large arid kingdom unto itself. I bought a camo hat and shatter-proof sunglasses at the canteen. I interviewed Lt. Col. David Doyle in his office, which was basically all packed up. I don't know how I was able to conduct a coherent interview, given my feeling of crushing naïveté, but I guess it was adrenaline. On the 27th I watched a haboob (هَبوب, or sand/dust storm) come over a hill and swallow the base as soldiers loaded their convoy. Sand everywhere. In my camera gear, in my teeth. It made the place seem even more alien.
One of those nights I wandered around the maze of CHUs, sectioned off by huge concrete blast walls. Found a group of privates burning material in preparation for closing the base. I will remember the weirdness of that. These kids, out in the desert, surrounded by concrete, watching the bright orange trash-can fire eat whatever they'd accumulated during their engagement at Al-Asad.
Then early morning (3:30-4am) wakeup call for the road march to Camp Taji -- a grueling, all-day affair that began in an MRAP lit only by soldiers' night vision lights, motored at a slow pace thru Anbar, and ended at Camp Taji after a piss break -- where we all lined up along a barbed wire fence, whipped out our dicks, and pissed on someone else's ground. I wrote a blog post about sitting across from a married medic, and how I kept looking back and forth from his wedding ring to the roadside, which theoretically could explode at any point, at any time. The view out the window? I recall a huge sun, the silhouettes of sheep and their herders, a young boy seeming to give us the finger. I ended the embed dirty, sweaty, wrung out, and yet all I had done was sit in a slow-moving vehicle.
Then, the following week:
All-day reporting in Anbar, the necessary in-the-field reporting counterpart to my in-the-MRAP experience. Went to the Ramadi compound of Sunni Awakening leader Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, where we were treated to a heap of sheep assfat. It was revolting, but the Iraqis dove in practically to their elbows. I couldn't not have some. The interview was stiff and not revelatory. Stopped by a police training center too. The takeaway was "No electricity? No trained police."
And there you have it. What's happening now in Anbar seems preordained, even by a short couple of visits by a rookie foreign correspondent two years ago. There are, of course, scads of reasons why things are falling apart, but the fact that at some point local Sunni police weren't properly trained because the Shia-led government couldn't (or wouldn't) provide them basic utilities -- well, the phrase "doomed from the start" comes to mind.
"Why did my friends die in Iraq?" Business Insider editor Paul Szoldra, a former Marine, asked Friday in a bitter essay. The answer, if there is one, is probably unthinkable.